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Abstract
First, I review the context for the need of new deliberative models, specifically agonistic deliberative 
models, for public discourse and for use in training students for public discourse. I then highlight five 
specific points that I trouble and enrich, principally through the work of Giroux, Arendt, Biesta, and 
Duarte. While I agree that there is great value in Lo’s description of the agonistic deliberative model, I 
advocate for what Biesta would call a weaker model of deliberation, one that sets the conditions for 
transformative education but one that does not act as an instrument for it.
This article is in response to
Lo, J. C. (2017). Empowering young people through conflict and conciliation: Attending to the politi-
cal and agonism in democratic education. Democracy & Education, 25(1), 1– 9. 
Available at: https:// democracyeducationjournal .org/ home/ vol25/ iss1/ 2/.
In a time and place where public dialogue is both waning yet critically important for the future of the democratic project, Lo has done an excellent job of explicating the 
context for the need of new deliberative models, specifically 
agonistic deliberative models, for public discourse and for use in 
training students for public discourse. The debate on how citizens 
ought to engage in democratic discourse in a pluralistic society is 
nuanced, and for this reason, it is salient to consider at least 
briefly the historical background of democratic discourse that 
leads us to our current concern. Lo positioned her argument in 
the context of the deliberative models of democratic discussion 
developed principally by German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, 
whose notion of deliberative democracy signaled a significant 
shift in contemporary discussion of political debate (Lubenow, 
2012, p. 58). Habermas was interested in what Cohen (1997) called 
“collective decisions of the members of a society” but then further 
considered precisely what it takes for a decision to be collective 
(p. 407).
Habermas’s work moved contemporary debates away  
from traditional democratic discourse focusing on aggregative,  
or procedural, democracy to a form of discourse that is not 
exclusively procedural, one which he referred to as deliberative 
democracy (Cohen, 1997, p. 411– 412). Rather than relying on 
procedural solutions to conflict, Habermas advocated for what 
Cohen (1997) called “political justification,” or “free public reason-
ing among equals” (p. 412). The desired outcome of this public 
reasoning or deliberation is that once a decision has been made in 
deliberation, participants “are prepared to cooperate in accordance 
with the results of such discussion, treating those results as 
authoritative” (Cohen, 1997, p. 413).
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It was at this point that Lo posited yet another pivot, this time 
away from this deliberative model to that of an agonistic one. The 
author opened by discussing the very conflicts that arise from 
pluralistic democracy that I mentioned earlier, and suggested that 
not only is this pluralism inherently divisive but conflict is in fact 
productive in a pluralistic society. Lo went on, through an analysis 
of Habermas, Rawls, Arendt, and Schmitt, to contrast the Haber-
masian deliberative model with the agonistic one. Lo elucidated 
the agonistic model through an analysis of the work of Arendt and 
Schmitt; Lo argued that both embrace unresolved conflict in such a 
way as to suggest this agonistic deliberative approach. Lo then 
described in greater detail this agonistic model, its benefits and 
conditions, and then ended with two useful concreate examples.
I hope with my paper to extend the dialogue of this critically 
important work through highlighting a few specific points that I 
trouble and enrich, principally through the work of Giroux (2011), 
Arendt (1959), Biesta (2014), and Duarte (2001). I suggest five 
principle areas worth troubling for further exploration. I aim to 
conclude that a conceptualization of agonistic deliberation would 
benefit from a weak, noninstrumentalist approach, which I 
develop further in this paper.
While I agree that there is great value in Lo’s description of the 
agonistic deliberative model, I advocate for a weaker model of 
deliberation, based on Biesta’s notion of weak education, a model 
that sets the conditions for transformative education but one that 
does not act as an instrument for it. To that end, I have highlighted 
areas that I explore to the end of developing a richer dialogue 
around the notion of agonism. First, I provide a deeper analysis of 
how emotion is treated in the article; then I explore what is meant 
by public and political in this context, followed by an exploration of 
transformation, the conditions for transformation, and the 
potential for oppression in agonism.
Emotion
Lo (2017) stated, “Strong emotive structures . . . may be at the root of 
conflicts,” and further that these emotions have significant value in 
democratic discourse (p. 5). I wonder, however, if we might explore 
emotion a bit further and tease out two pieces that deserve further 
consideration. First, consider the relationship between emotion, 
rationality, and legitimacy. Lo (2017) wrote, “Students may feel like 
strangers are only willing to listen and talk about the issues that are 
rational, rather than to listen to and validate their feelings on difficult 
issues that are incommensurable with societal norms” (p. 5). My 
concern here is that it could be read that those with marginal 
viewpoints are not rational; rather, they are emotional. While it is 
true that “emotional” doesn’t have to be read as “irrational,” it is a 
critical point that the emotions of the marginal do not need valida-
tion, as they are already valid. The notion alludes to Delpit’s (2006) 
description of a “paternalism” that suggests that certain marginal 
groups must “be given voice” (p. 19). Giroux (2011) further suggested 
that within this paternalism we favor only “meanings, abilities, 
language forms, and tastes that are directly or indirectly defined by 
dominant groups as socially legitimate” (p. 22).
While I agree with the author that emotion should not be 
quelled in the classroom, I suggest a cautionary note: Rather than 
simply conceptualizing emotional response as an outlet for 
marginal groups, we might also allow for the potentiality that 
listening to the Other might actually teach us something tangible 
from these emotional responses. As Shapiro (2006) pointed out in 
Loosing Heart: The Moral and Spiritual Miseducation of America’s 
Children, “We must develop the capacity for compassionate 
attentiveness to the words of the other” (p. 161). This is important 
because while Shapiro clearly pointed out that “people’s identifica-
tion with a particular point of view is, first, a matter of our emo-
tional connections to it,” what ultimately mattered to him was an 
attentiveness to the words of the Other (p. 161). For this reason, it 
seems prudent to reiterate that emotion is valuable; it ought not be 
seen as replacing the need for listening to the words of those who 
are marginalized (p. 161).
The second concern in relation to emotion involves its 
usefulness; while I agree with Lo (2017) in her validation of 
emotion as both acceptable in discourse and potentially fruitful, it 
is the insinuation that emotion might be fashioned as instrumen-
talist that seems problematic. Certainly to allow space for the 
honest and organic expression of emotion is legitimate, but then 
“‘to [mobilize] those passions towards the promotion of demo-
cratic designs’” seems a bit like using emotion as a means to an end, 
thus instrumentalizing a basic aspect of the human condition 
(Mouffe, cited in Lo, 2017, p. 6). In addition to the verb mobilize, 
twice the author used the word channel in reference to emotional 
conflict. Once Lo suggested to “channel that conflict positively, as 
opposed to minimizing or eliminating the conflict rationally,” and 
the second mention of the word was when the author suggested 
channeling these conflicts for productive ends (pp. 5– 6). I am left 
worrying that this approach risks dissolving “theory into utility” 
(Giroux, 2011, p. 33). Indeed, even as Lo laid out two agonistic 
strategies at the end, it seems this focus on “technique” might 
further serve to objectify and devalue the emotional response 
themselves (Giroux, 2011, p. 20). A further concern related to this 
instrumentalism is taken up in the following section, where I 
consider the implications of what these instruments might be 
designed to accomplish.
The Public, the Private, and the Political
Lo (2017) was clearly concerned with a waning of the public sphere 
of dialogue (p. 3). The withdrawal from the public world into  
the private is cause for concern, and Lo made an impactful point 
here. Lo (2017), quoting Rawls, noted that public spaces in this sense 
are places where individuals can “practice public reason,” and where 
“they create the political ‘from shared fundamental ideas implicit in 
the public political culture’” (p. 4). Two distinct issues come to mind 
at this point. First, students are becoming “isolated in an increasingly 
individualized world or socialized into their own segregated 
communities” (Lo, 2017, p. 8). This segregation takes the form of 
communities of faith, thought, and action. Further, Lo (2017) made a 
second point that this manifests in a rise in the “privatization of 
schools, universities, and political processes,” making this need to 
reclaim public spaces “for the political” of critical importance (p. 8).
While there is much in these notions that are of critical 
importance, it is vital to point out that the public and the political 
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are terms that might need further examination. First, while Lo 
developed understanding of the political and the public from the 
work of Arendt, the article did not make mention that Arendt 
(1959), in “Reflections on Little Rock,” made a stark statement 
about children and the political and public spheres:
The conflict between a segregated home and a desegregated school, 
between family prejudice and school demands, abolishes at one stroke 
both the teachers’ and the parents’ authority, replacing it with the rule 
of public opinion among children who have neither the ability nor  
the right to establish a public opinion of their own (p. 56)
Contextually, it is important to note that Arendt here was speaking 
specifically of the American civil rights movement school integra-
tion, and she believed rather strongly that children of color in this 
instance were being used as political pawns when they had no 
business being in the public or political forum. This raises an 
important query: Are public schools really public forums at all, or 
are they are in fact only simulations of the public world? If the latter 
is true, should they be treated as such and not approached in quite 
the political fashion that one might a public space?
To be clear, I am not arguing that education is not political or 
even that there is nothing political that happens in the classroom. 
Clearly this is not true; from curricular biases, gerrymandered 
districts, hidden curricula, and systemic racism, it is demonstrably 
true that schooling is already intensely politicized. However, if we 
return to Arendt’s (1959) notion of vita activa, there might be a 
distinction to be made between the political aspects of school and 
having students “do” politics. The active doing of politics is, for 
Arendt, a public and specifically adult endeavor.
But I do think that there is something to be said for the 
simulation of the public, and the examples that Lo provided might 
well serve as this type of simulation, but with a caveat: The simula-
tion is not a place to act, but to practice acting, and then reflect 
critically on this action. In the words of Duarte (2001), referencing 
Arendt, “‘thinking is a solitary, apolitical endeavor that happens 
apart from political affairs of everyday life’” (p. 210). If democratic 
education is to flourish, surely allowing students space to think 
becomes a cornerstone of practice, especially following an agonis-
tic simulation. Otherwise, one cannot move from acting (or 
simulating an act) to thinking on that act in order to enrich and 
develop meaning.
With that in mind, we come now to a critical delineation 
between the personal space and the public life in the classroom. If, 
as Duarte (2001) stated, “thinking, properly speaking, cannot 
occur when one is ‘in the world,”’ we ought not force students to 
make public utterances on their thinking about social justice 
concerns in all contexts (p. 216). This directly challenges what 
Duarte (2001) called “models of learning that leave no room for 
‘inner speech,’ and, thus, appear to ‘infantilize’ students by 
requiring them to constantly ‘speak their minds’” (p. 207). Using 
what Duarte (2001) called a pedagogy of contemplation, the 
pedagogue might “echo the voice of the Delphic Oracle and exhort 
students to ‘stop and think’ in order to take up the most challeng-
ing yet pressing of learning assignments: know thyself ” (p. 216). 
The social justice project in classroom spaces then becomes one of 
contemplative thinking about students’ prejudices and hatred 
without the threat of aggression present in public discourse, 
understanding that the “activity of thinking [as opposed to public 
debating] is among the conditions that make [people] abstain from 
evil doing or even actually ‘condition’ them against it” (Duarte, 
2001, p. 220).
This thinking cannot occur in “public,” or specifically around 
others. As Duarte (2001) went on to say, “The need to withdraw 
from the company of others and, thereby, to ‘stop and think’ is . . . 
an integral part of the human condition” (p. 202). To conclude this 
section, I would reiterate that the teacher that uses agonism ought 
to potentially consider two key ideas. First, that the use of this 
public discourse style ought to be used in simulation only, and 
second, there should be the opportunity to “clear some discursive 
space for the articulation of alternative pedagogical models” that 
give space for reflective thinking on the political simulation 
(p. 207).
Transformation and Oppression
The next point that I explore is that of the truth of oppression. Lo 
(2017) certainly demonstrated that there is pedagogical value in 
agonism, and I see this as principally preparing students for the 
public world, that they might not withdraw from the world of 
political discourse. Lo, however, suggested that agonistic delibera-
tion can “transform” students, and it is this notion that I trouble in 
this section. Lo elaborated about this transformative understand-
ing by suggesting that:
Instead of having students engage in political tolerance, which sets 
aside differences temporarily to logically consider the rights available 
to everyone, agonism asks students to transform their ideas about the 
world. Instead of just putting their difference on hold for the sake of 
human rights, the agonistic process encourages students to challenge 
their own positionalities (as well as one another’s positions) in the 
conflict. (p. 6)
In the midst of what Shapiro (2006) called “a culture that empha-
sizes a ‘cool insensitivity’ to the feelings of others,” students might 
be transformed through a method of agnostic deliberation (p. 161). 
The concern here is that in this agonistic model, even if much 
might be learned about respecting the rules of engagement and 
public dignity, it seems difficult to imagine agonistic discourse 
transforming someone. A part of the problem here comes from  
the fact that the teacher seems to be more facilitator or midwife  
of the process and therefore not actively exposing students to 
truths about privilege and oppression. Certainly a topic might 
present opportunities to engage around issues of social justice, but 
it doesn’t seem as though this is guaranteed to occur. As Bettez, 
Black, Conley, and Ezzell (2008) wrote in “Social Justice Activist 
Teaching in the University Classroom,” “Education that does not 
address issues of privilege and oppression is not transformative 
education . . . [and] avoiding issues of power and inequality allows 
students to continue to believe prevalent myths” (p. 283).
While I understand that an agonistic deliberative model is 
conceived to give power to the marginalized and develop trans-
formation, it seems that without some sense of value placed on 
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issues of power, privilege, oppression, and inequality, a model that 
lets students get there from agonistic deliberation seems almost an 
attempt by the teacher to develop detachment, or even neutrality. 
On the one hand, Lo (2017) wrote that traditional deliberative 
models might leave the marginalized with “feelings of dis-
empowerment [that] may be entrenched further by a deliberative 
framework that hopes to leave students with a ‘feel good’ or 
‘everyone is a winner’ perception” (p. 5). I see how traditional 
deliberative models might do this, but I am unsure that the 
agonistic model is demonstrably different in this regard. With this 
in mind, I cite Lo again, this time speaking about agonistic 
deliberation: “Agonistic deliberation, on the other hand, would 
take great care to validate students’ perspectives no matter how 
bizarre, jarring, or irrational they may seem” (p. 7). A problem 
arising here is that validating students’ perspectives, no matter how 
bizarre, seems very similar to the “everybody is a winner” way of 
thinking. I suspect that Lo saw agonistic deliberation as more 
specifically validating marginalized students’ perspectives, but still 
this seems to be leaving the situation value free. Were these 
agonistic deliberations coupled with explicit discussions of power, 
privilege, oppression, and inequality then we might be able to 
realize Macedo’s (1994) vison that “we must first read the 
world— the cultural, social, and political practices that constitute 
it— before we can make sense of the word level description of 
reality” (p. 27). Specifically, without a working understanding of 
these kinds of concepts, the experiences of marginal communities 
might continue to seem distant, vague, and unintelligible, even in 
the midst of agonistic deliberation.
Finally, in this section, I want to critically consider the very 
notion of transformation. While it seems a bit of a paradox, the 
experience of education might be transformative yet becomes 
more difficult when educational models seek to transform. When 
describing an emancipatory teaching experience in his book The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster, philosopher Jacques Rancière (1991) 
pointed out that the teacher “had transmitted nothing. He had not 
used any method. The method was purely the student’s” (p. 14). In 
contrast, Lo (2017) made clear in this article that there is a goal  
in mind for this agonistic deliberation and that the techniques 
explored are instruments for achieving “future 
transformation— transformation of how everyone in the class 
perceives their realities” (p. 7). To trouble this idea, I turn to 
philosopher Gert Biesta (2014), who, in The Beautiful Risk of 
Education, pointed out that “transformation can never be driven 
from the perspective of the self and its desires, but always requires 
engagement with what or who is other” (p. 3). Could agonistic 
deliberation allow for the possibility of transformation by the 
Other? Certainly, but I think that transformation involves always a 
risk, and positioning transformation as something that can be 
accomplished through a model seeks to eliminate the risk inherent 
in the transformative pedagogical event.
Creating Conditions for Transformation
How can we provide the conditions for the kind of transformative 
experience agonistic deliberation has the potential of being? I pose 
this question because there are some tacit assumptions that need 
unpacking to understand how groundwork might be set to make 
this agonism function. Lo (2017) wrote, quoting Mouffe:
Agonism anticipates to face and struggle with a dissimilar adversary. 
This distinction is important because “an adversary is a legitimate 
enemy, an enemy with whom we have in common a shared adhesion 
to the ethico- political principles of democracy.” (p. 6)
I highlight this passage because I wonder if the conditions are 
typically set to make this happen. I certainly agree that it is possible 
to set the conditions for a shared adhesion to these principles, but 
also I argue that it cannot never be assumed as a given. This is 
particularly true in light of the fact that we, as a culture, have 
difficulty even developing a clear definition of freedom (Greene, 
1988, p. 19). Given the structural disconnect between signs like 
freedom and their significations, I turn to back to the philosopher 
Gert Biesta (2014), who argued that “the teacher not only needs to 
give the learner the truth, but also needs to give the learner ‘the 
condition of recognizing it as truth’” (p. 50 Quoting Kierkegaard). 
Biesta, in The Beautiful Risk of Education, outlined an approach 
whereby there is a focus on the conditions- that- might- lead- to as 
opposed to a formula- for- the- development- of. Biesta (2014) 
referred to this distinction as “weak” versus “strong” education 
(p. 11). In this conceptualization, the teacher still oversees an act of 
creation, or “an act of bringing something new into the word, 
something that did not exist before” (Biesta, 2014, p. 11). The 
difference is that in the weak form of creation, the focus is on  
the conditions that allow for creation; by extension then, we  
might think of developing a weak deliberation as setting the 
conditions that allow for a democratic transformation during 
agonistic deliberation. Applying aspects of Biesta’s weakness in 
education to deliberative models would see agonistic models 
allowing for the very risk that might actually result in transforma-
tive learning experiences, without envisioning a specific end result. 
In short, we cannot simulate encounters with the Other that 
produce transformative experiences; rather, we might envision 
creating spaces that empower the marginalized Other to share 
their experiences without expecting a particular result.
Conclusion: Deliberation without Oppression
In a final point, I want to leave a caution about existential reality in 
the process of agonism. Lo’s (2017) notion of validating the 
narratives of marginal groups is extremely powerful, and I am in 
total agreement that “rather than providing only rational evidence 
to logically back up their assertions, students can provide anec-
dotal stories or experiences that give rise to their thinking” (p. 8). 
This resonates because it really does speak to the classic feminist 
statement that the personal becomes political. However, there is a 
cautionary point here, and I think that it comes from the flip side of 
this argument. Everything that is allowed for with marginal groups 
will become fair game for those with oppressive viewpoints, and 
this is somewhat alarming, as I have witnessed firsthand in my 
classrooms that students often have a great deal of emotionally 
charged and anecdotal evidence to justify racism, homophobia, 
patriarchy, and other troubling ideas. It is true that “peoples’ identi-
fication with a particular point of view is, first, a matter of our 
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emotional connections to it” and that “one must start by acknowl-
edging that one’s own perspective is a story that might occlude, 
distort, or silence the experience of the other” (Shapiro, 2006, 
pp. 160– 161). If we take these to be true, then agonistic deliberation 
perhaps risks the further marginalization of certain groups by 
legitimizing racist, sexist, and other bigoted points of view. This is 
why, when developing conditions for the agonistic deliberative 
event, it is critical to allow for risk and therefore leave the project 
pen but also to create conditions that at least minimize the 
likelihood of aggressions against marginalized and vulnerable 
populations. Yes, agonistic deliberative models of pedagogy are 
needed to strengthen democratic debate, but care must be taken to 
execute a weaker model of deliberation: one that sets the condi-
tions for transformative education, does not act as an instrument 
for it, and is at its core antioppressive.
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